At the hearing on the successful defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion—but before she moved for fees—the trial court granted the motion, but denied fees. This was surprising for two reasons. One, the prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant has a right to fees. Two, and more interesting, the defendant hadn’t even made her motion yet.
Reversing, Ruano v. Goldberg (D2d4 Jan. 21, 2025, No. B326833) 2025 WL 258271 (nonpub. opn.) held the prevailing party had a right to a hearing. True, pro se litigants aren’t normally entitled to attorneys’ fees. But that’s not a categorical rule, and the successful anti-SLAPP defendant was entitled to argue some recoverable fees, even if as pro se her recovery may be limited. By ruling before even giving her a hearing, the trial court erred.
In fact, in signing the settled statement as the oral record of the proceedings—pretty savvy move for any appellant, especially pro se—the trial court acknowledge the error in prematurely denying fees. But as the appeal had already been filed, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to fix the error.
The outcome is correct but a little surprising. What is surprising is that the Court of Appeal said that the litigant “was entitled to a hearing on her motion for attorney fees.” Technically, I’m not sure that’s true. There is no general right to a “hearing,” and the right to brief a law-and-motion matter generally is enough. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232.)
So the court didn’t really mean that the defendant had a right to hearing. What the court really meant was that the trial court cannot deny a motion that hasn’t been made.
(Thanks to Cal. Attorneys’ Fees blog for the tip to this case.)