A bedrock rule of appellate practice is that an appellant who fails to brief an issue forfeits that issue. That rule applies to appellants. You know, the person challenging the judgment. It does not apply to the respondent—the person defending the judgment. Why? Because a bedrock principle of appellate review is that all intendments and presumptions are given to support the judgment.
But the court in Baltazar v. ACE Parking Mgmt. (D4d1 Oct. 26, 2023 No. D081483) [nonpub. opn.] held the respondent forfeited a basis for upholding the judgment. The respondent was the employee-plaintiff who opposed the employer’s petition to compel arbitration. One of the defenses the employee asserted was that the contract was unconscionable. The trial court refused to compel certain aspects of arbitration, and the employer appealed.
Responding to the employer’s brief, the respondent employee mentions her unconscionability argument only very briefly in a footnote. The opinion does not indicate whether the appellant spent much time on the issue. But the court, in an opinion authored by Justice Do, faults the respondent for not developing the unconscionability defense beyond the single footnote.
Here are the court’s criticisms of the respondent’s cursory reference to unconscionability, followed by this commentator’s reactions:
The opinion includes a lot of analysis of principles of arbitration law, and perhaps that analysis is sound. But the analysis of appellate procedure is not sound. A respondent generally may not stipulate to reverse a judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 128(a)(8)), and what may not be done directly may not be done indirectly.
The employer also failed to supply an oral record, and in other cases this would be enough to affirm. (E.g., Tim Kowal, “You still need a reporter's transcript even if nothing happened at the hearing,” Oct. 16, 2023 at https://kowallawgroup.com/you-still-need-a-reporters-transcript-even-if-nothing-happened-at-the-hearing/.) At a minimum, if the court believed the trial court did not adequately consider unconscionability, the matter should have been remanded for further proceedings on it.
But it is just wrong to suggest that a respondent can forfeit grounds supporting a judgment that the reviewing court, following basic appellate procedure, must infer.