Kowal Law Group Logo
split

Anti-SLAPP Denials May Not Be Appealable Much Longer in the 9th Circuit

Tim Kowal     June 6, 2022

The anti-SLAPP statute allows defendants to challenge complaints that chill the rights to speak and petition. But the rights to speak and petition have blurry and elastic boundaries. So often plaintiffs with legitimate claims get stuck defending SLAPP motions.

Worse, when the plaintiff defeats a meritless SLAPP motion, the defendant gets to appeal.

That’s what happened—twice—in the now-seven-year-old case of Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, LLC, 2022 WL 1800780 (9th Cir. Jun. 2, 2022). The founders of The Turtles sued Pandora for failing to pay for playing Turtles songs. Pandora filed anti-SLAPP motions arguing playing music was protected speech. Two appeals and seven years later, Pandora lost.

Denials of SLAPP Motions Are Considered Collateral Orders in the 9th Circuit, But Judge Bress Thinks They Shouldn’t Be:

Judge Daniel Bress wrote a concurring opinion saying this is too much to take. The federal rules do not provide for the appealability of denials of anti-SLAPP motions. Instead, they have been held to be appealable as “collateral orders.” But a collateral order is an order that, among other things, is “completely separate from the merits of the action.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006). And an anti-SLAPP motion explicitly requires the moving party to prove the complaint lacks merit. So, by definition, an anti-SLAPP denial is not a collateral order.

This is not a new argument. Judge Bress favorably cited the concurrence of Judge Watford, joined by then-Chief Judge Kozinski and Judges Paez and Bea, in Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261 (9th Cir. 2013), where the same reasoning was offered.

In Makaeff, the majority rejected that reasoning, holding that “while the inquiry on the motion to strike may glance at the merits, its central purpose is to provide an added statutory protection from the burdens of litigation that is unavailable during the ultimate merits inquiry.”

Of course, that could be said of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and denial of those motions are not collateral orders. So the Makaeff holding is not wholly satisfying.

Judge Bress also noted that the 9th Circuit’s precedent making SLAPP orders appealable as collateral orders is falling out of step with other circuits, including the 2nd, 7th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits, and more recently the 11th Circuit.

Another Wrinkle in the Appealability of SLAPP Orders:

Here is another nuance to keep in mind:

An order granting a SLAPP motion is a final order, and immediately appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But an order granting a SLAPP motion is not listed in FRAP 58, which requires final orders other than those listed in rule 58 to be formalized in a separate document—a judgment. Without the judgment, § 1291 final orders not listed in rule 58 are still appealable, but the deadline to file the notice of appeal is 150 days, rather than the usual 30.

But an order denying a SLAPP motion is appealable as a collateral order, rather than as a final order under § 1291. So rule 58 seemingly does not apply. Thus, the deadline to appeal a denial of a SLAPP motion is 30 days. In contrast, the deadline to appeal a grant of a SLAPP motion may be 30 days, or it may be 150 days if a separate judgment is not entered.

Tim Kowal is an appellate specialist certified by the California State Bar Board of Legal Specialization. Tim helps trial attorneys and clients win their cases and avoid error on appeal. He co-hosts the Cal. Appellate Law Podcast at CALpodcast.com, and publishes summaries of cases and appellate tips for trial attorneys. Contact Tim at [email protected] or (949) 676-9989.
Get “Not To Be Published,” a weekly digest of these articles, delivered directly to your inbox!
Subscribe

"Upon putting laws into writing, they became even harder to change than before, and a hundred legal fictions rose to reconcile them with reality."

— Will Durant

"So far as the beginnings of law had theories, the first theory of liability was in terms of a duty to buy off the vengeance of him to whom an injury had been done whether by oneself or by something in one's power. The idea is put strikingly in the Anglo-Saxon legal proverb, 'Buy spear from side or bear it,' that is, buy off the feud or fight it out."

— Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law

“It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?”

— James Madison, Federalist 62

"Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad people will find a way around the laws."

— Plato (427-347 B.C.)

"At common law, barratry was 'the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels' (4 Blackstone, Commentaries 134) and was punished as a misdemeanor."

Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187

"A judge is a law student who grades his own papers."

— H.L. Mencken

"It may be that the court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I should be sorry to think that it is anything else."

— Hon. Sir Owen Dixon, Chief Justice of Australia

"God made the angels to show Him splendor, … Man He made to serve Him wittily, in the tangle of his mind."

— Sir Thomas More in Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons

Show neither partiality to the weak nor deference to the mighty, but judge your fellow men justly.

Leviticus

"Moot points have to be settled somehow, once they get thrust upon us. If an assertion cannot be proved, then it must be settled some other way, and nearly all of these ways are unfair to somebody."

—T.H. White, The Once and Future King

"Counsel on the firing line in an actual trial must be prepared for surprises, including requests for amendments of pleading. They cannot ask that a judgment afterwards obtained be set aside merely because their equilibrium was slightly disturbed by an unexpected motion."

Posz v. Burchell (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 324, 334

Copyright © 2024 Kowal Law Group
menuchevron-down
linkedin facebook pinterest youtube rss twitter instagram facebook-blank rss-blank linkedin-blank pinterest youtube twitter instagram